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UNILATERAL REFUSALS TO DEAL, VERTICAL INTEGRATION, AND
THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE
Herbert Hovenkamp *

Introduction; relation to vertical integration.
Where it applies, the essential facility doctrine requires a monopolist to
share its "essential facility." Since the only qualifying exclusionary practice
is the refusal to share the facility itself, the doctrine comes about as close
as antitrust ever does to condemning "no fault" monopolization. 1
It should be clear that the essential facility doctrine concerns
vertical integration -- in particular, the duty of a vertically integrated
monopolist to share some input in a vertically related market, which we call
market #1, with someone operating in an upstream or downstream market
which we shall call #2. If the facility is truly "essential," then the #1
monopoly facility also establishes a #2 monopoly. For example, the
plaintiff might claim that a municipal sports stadium (market #1) is the
essential facility the plaintiff needs in order to run a professional basketball
franchise (market #2). 2 Or a surgeon might claim that a hospital (market
#1) is an essential facility that the plaintiff needs to engage in his surgical
practice (market #2). Once again, if the hospital really is "essential," then
refusal to share the #1 hospital monopoly creates the #2 surgical
monopoly. 3 Or the claimed essential facility may be a natural gas pipeline
(market #1), and the plaintiff someone wishing to sell gas (market #2) in the
market for which the pipeline is an input. If the pipeline really is essential,
refusal to share the pipeline (#1) entails a gas monopoly (#2) as well. 4 Or
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. For the original Areeda-Turner proposal respecting "no fault" monopoly, see 3 Phillip
E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&630-638 (3d ed. 2008) (hereinafter
"Antitrust Law").
2. E.g., Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding essentiality).
3. E.g., McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp. of Independence, Kan., 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir.
1988) (hospital emergency room and obstetrical care unit not essential facility for plaintiff
who performed same services in his own private office).
4. See Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 730 F. Supp. 826 (C.D.
Ill. 1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992) (gas
pipeline not an essential facility when the plaintiff could ship its gas by other means). Cf.
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(defendant is vertically integrated phone service company controlling local loop; plaintiffs
wish to interconnect in order to provide service in competition with the defendant).
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refusal to share diagnostic software for identifying computer problems
(market #1) is said to be an essential facility because it excludes the
plaintiff from the service market for repairing the defendant's computers
(market #2). 5 Or in the cases involving telephone white or yellow pages
the defendant is a telephone company (market #1) and the plaintiff a
competitor in the market for publishing phone books (market #2). The
claim is that the customer database generated by the telephone operations
(#1) is an essential input into producing the books (#2). 6 Or the defendant
may control a computerized reservation system (market #1), alleged to be
essential to the plaintiff's business of air passenger transport (market #2);
once again, if the reservation system is truly "essential," then the refusal to
share the reservation system monopoly would create a second monopoly
in the passenger market. 7
To be sure, not every owner of an "essential" input is vertically
integrated. For example, perhaps the monopoly gas pipeline owner sells
no gas of its own but only operates the pipeline. It then sells space to
some firms in the market but not others, and the latter claim an essential
facility. 8 But in such a case it is hard to conceive of an antitrust rationale
for enforcing a duty to deal that does not involve some kind of integration
as between the pipeline and the gas shippers with whom it is dealing. If
the pipeline refuses the plaintiff for lack of space there is no antitrust
problem at all. If it refuses the plaintiff merely for personal or other noneconomic reasons, the refusal may be governed by tort but antitrust is not
apt. If it refuses the plaintiff because it has exclusive contracts with
existing customers, then antitrust may be apt 9 but then we have moved into
the realm of vertical integration as well. Under the general rule that only
5. See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185 (D.
Mass. 1991), aff'd in relevant part, 36 F.d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994) (defendant's diagnostic
program for analyzing its computers not an essential facility as to an independent computer
repairer where latter was capable of producing its own diagnostic alternatives).
6. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, 957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. (1992) (rural telephone company's refusal to license white pages listings to
publisher of a competing directory not unlawful denial of essential facility when the
information contained in the listings could have been obtained from other sources).
7. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 977 (1992) (no essential facility where it was possible for the plaintiffs to
do business without access to the defendant's system).
8. E.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (defendant's
processor technology was licensed to customers, not to competitors).
9. Indeed, the practice may violate Clayton '3 proscriptions on exclusive dealing
without any need for a showing of essential facility. See 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law &1802 (2d ed. 2005).
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rivals of the defendant have standing to sue, 10 actionable essential facility
claims always (or virtually always) involve vertical integration.
Understanding the "vertical" nature of essential facility claims helps
to focus the analysis: the essential facility claim is about the duty to deal of
a monopolist who is able to supply an input for itself in a fashion that is so
superior than anything else available that others cannot succeed unless
they can access this firm's input as well. For this reason a strict conception
of objectively measured "essentiality" is critical to any rational essential
facility doctrine: competition ordinarily entails that each firm supplies its
own inputs or -- if they are to be procured jointly -- that this be done by
voluntary agreements that are (1) not anticompetitive and (2) mutually
beneficial to both parties.
Consistency With Antitrust's Purpose?
The essential facility doctrine requires a defendant to share its
qualifying monopoly facility with one or more rivals. Antitrust's purpose,
however, is not to force firms to share their monopolies, but to prevent
monopolies from occurring or to break them down when they do occur. 11
Forcing a firm to share its monopoly is inconsistent with antitrust basic
goals for two reasons. First, consumers are no better off when a monopoly
is shared; ordinarily, price and output are the same as they were when one
monopolist used the input alone. Second, the right to share a monopoly
discourages firms from developing their own alternative inputs.
On the first point, suppose that the defendant owns a gas pipeline
which, if operated competitively would carry 100 units at a price of $1.00.
However, since the defendant is a monopolist it maximizes its profits at by
carrying 80 units at a price of $1.50. A plaintiff rival proceeding under the
essential facility doctrine persuades a court to enjoin the defendant to sell
20 units of space in the pipeline to the plaintiff. In this case the defendant
will comply with the injunction by selling 20 units of space to the plaintiff at
a price of $1.50, reducing its own sales to others to 60 units. That is, since
the monopoly price and demand are determined by total market demand at
the delivery end, it makes little difference to the defendant if it delivers the
gas personally or through the agency of others.
Of course, the court might order the firm to sell the gas at a price of
10. See 3B Antitrust Law &774d and Intergraph, note _.
11. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996) (essential facility doctrine
has "nothing to do with antitrust principles," for "consumers are not better off if the natural
monopolist is forced to share some of his profits with potential competitors....").
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$1.00, which would then increase output to the competitive level, but the
numbers in the illustration belie the complexity of such determinations in
the real world. Such a solution is nothing less than price regulation of the
kind undertaken by regulatory agencies -- something for which both the
federal courts and the antitrust litigation process are extremely ill suited
and which is, in any event, inconsistent with antitrust's fundamental
"market" orientation to problems of lack of competition. 12
The second problem with the injunction requiring the defendant to
share its pipeline is that the order either removes or reduces the plaintiff's
incentive to develop its own independent capacity for transporting gas to
the market. To be sure, that incentive may not be removed altogether.
Although receiving market access at a monopoly price is better than no
access at all, it is not as good as receiving access at a competitive price.
Thus at some future time the plaintiff may prefer to build its own pipeline
rather than pay the defendant a monopoly rental. But nevertheless,
sharing of space is what the plaintiff is requesting in the original
proceeding, thus implying that for the time being it will share the monopoly
pipeline rather than build its own. If the court goes the second step,
ordering the defendant to provide the facility and regulating the price to
competitive levels, then the plaintiffs' incentive to build an alternative facility
is largely destroyed.
This problem of loss of competitor incentive may be insubstantial in
the case where neither the plaintiff nor anyone else could ever duplicate
the claimed input in any effective way. But it could be extremely serious to
the point of undermining antitrust goals in the case where either the plaintiff
or some other rival or group of rivals could enter the market by some
alternative not requiring the sharing of the defendant's facility. In that case,
a court injunction requiring the defendant to share actually perpetuates the
monopoly by reducing the incentive for development of realistically
available competitive alternatives.
Constraints
The "essential facility" doctrine is both harmful and unnecessary
and should be abandoned. 13 The doctrine is harmful for the reasons
outlined briefly below. In virtually every instance where competitive
problems can be effectively addressed by forcing the monopolist to deal,
traditional doctrine of refusal to deal is sufficient to the task.

12. See 3B Antitrust Law &765c.
13. For Professor Areeda's views see Phillip E. Areeda, The "Essential Facility"
Doctrine: an Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841 (1989).
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Nevertheless, the doctrine has been accepted in principle, at least
by some circuits although not the Supreme Court; so here we take the
more constrained route of seeking to limit the doctrine's scope so as to
make it as consistent as possible with the general goals of antitrust, which
are to permit firms to enter and operate in markets to the extent they are
capable of supplying their own inputs, and without interference from
dominant firms. Under this constraint, we recognize only three situations in
which an essential doctrine is even arguably appropriate:
(a) natural monopoly, where rivals can be accommodated without
duplication of a facility, and duplication itself would be socially
wasteful;
(b) price-regulated monopoly utilities, where the doctrine really
operates so as to reduce the scope of the utility's statutory
monopoly; 14 and
(c) publicly owned facilities such as sports arenas that are supplied
to private firms at subsidized rates and cannot practicably be
duplicated.
Even in these cases the essential facility doctrine continues to suffer
from the infirmity that sharing the monopoly does nothing to restore output
and price to competitive levels. For example, suppose that rental on a
municipally owned stadium has a market value of $10,000 per night, but is
given to the antitrust defendant for a subsidized rate of $2000. If this
landlord relets, the price will probably be $10000 in any event, and it will
pocket the monopoly markup. Judicially compelling a lower price once
again turns the antitrust tribunal into a price regulator.
To be sure, there may be circumstances when the refusal to share
increases entry barriers into duplication of the essential facility itself. For
example, suppose the defendant controls a gas pipeline. If it is forced to
share, the plaintiff may begin building a customer base and might
eventually acquire enough customers to build its own pipeline but would
not have done so if not permitted to enter the market by sharing. But such
long-run effects are highly speculative. In the short-run, the plaintiff claims
to be unable to build its own pipeline, else the facility would not be
essential.

14. On essential facility claims involving price regulated utilities, see 3B Antitrust Law
&787.
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Intuitive and Historical Rationales
Through Aspen Skiing 15 and Trinko 16

The best way to introduce a possible "essential facility" doctrine is
to state its intuitive appeal and note the Supreme Court precedents that
have been called upon to support it. The core concern of the doctrine is
that a monopolist possesses a resource that is "essential" in some sense
for the business of someone else, but that the monopolist refuses to share.
The monopoly may rest on a legal license (such as a patent or public utility
franchise), natural monopoly (market that can support only one efficient
producer), public subsidy (e.g., market will not support a stadium but local
government subsidizes its construction), a very thin market (a small town
cannot support two movie houses), natural fortuity (only one mine supplies
an important mineral), or any substantial cost advantage possessed by a
single firm. The monopoly might be a "bottleneck" in that fully competitive
markets exist on both sides of it. Suppose, for example, that many
competing mines lie in a certain mountain range, that the only practical way
to transport the mineral lies across the defendant's land, and that the
mineral, once across the defendant's land, is sold to many competing firms,
which refine and sell it. Through the mere happenstance of location, the
defendant can set a price for crossing its land that captures the entire
monopoly returns available for that mineral, just as if it owned a monopoly
in the mineral itself. 17
The plaintiff may theoretically be in varying relationships to the
monopolist 18 -- perhaps an ultimate consumer (would-be movie patron
denied access to a town's only cinema); a business that, though not a
competitor of the monopolist, is injured in competition with its rivals (an
airline's flights are not listed or are listed less favorably than its rivals' in a
monopolist's popular list of flights); or a would-be competitor of the
monopolist (fabricator seeks ingot from integrated monopolist; or new
supplier of long distance service seeks interconnection with local telephone
monopolist who also supplies long distance service). As noted previously,
however, at bottom the essential facility doctrine is a problem in vertical
integration. 19
15. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
16. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004).
17. That is, a monopolist over any link in a production chain can obtain the entire
monopoly markup for that chain.
18. However, as a general matter only competitors have standing to sue. See 3B
Antitrust Law &774d.
19. See 3B Antitrust Law &771a.
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The intuitive attraction of requiring the owner of an "essential
facility" to deal fairly with the plaintiff is weak in the case of the consumer,
perhaps stronger where the monopolist distorts competition between the
plaintiff and its rivals, and perhaps stronger still where the plaintiff seeks to
be a rival of the monopolist. It may be strongest where a public franchise
or fortuitous monopoly radiates outward to strangle competition that is
possible in adjoining markets. For example, whether or not local "hardwired" telephone service is best delivered by a monopoly, it would be
unwise to allow that monopoly to obstruct free competition in long distance
services or telephone instruments, where competition is clearly possible.
As we shall see, the primary use of the so-called essential facility
doctrine has been in cases where a monopolist refuses to share some
important input with actual or potential competitors. This recognition
should make clear that the "essential facility" is just an epithet describing
the monopolist's situation: the monopolist possesses something the plaintiff
wants. It is not an independent tool of analysis but only a label--a label that
beguiles some commentators and courts into pronouncing a duty to deal
without analyzing the implications already considered at length in this
chapter.
In possible support of imposing a duty upon a monopolist to share
its essential facility are cases falling into two groups, one involving
horizontal combinations (Terminal Railroad, Associated Press), and one
involving single, dominant firms (Griffith, Otter Tail and arguably Aspen).
Taken individually, none of these decisions comes close to establishing an
"essential facility" doctrine. Taken collectively, as we show, they do very
little more. And in any event the Supreme Court's Trinko decision
undermined or at least severely qualified almost everything that Aspen
gave.
Dealing obligations imposed by '2 -- Historical Decisions
The Supreme Court has never articulated or approved the modern
version of the essential facility doctrine, although neither has it categorically
rejected it. 20 The most recent decision finding a basis in '2 doctrine for
condemning a unilateral refusal to deal expressly avoided reliance on any
essential facility claim. 21 Nevertheless, several older decisions contain
either factual elements or dicta upon which modern protagonists of the
doctrine rely. We develop these briefly, and then turn to the Supreme
20. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
21. Aspen Skiing, note _ at 611 n.44.
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Court's two most recent statements -- first, the problematic and overused
Aspen decision; and second, the severe qualifications developed in Trinko.
Terminal Railroad. 22 An "essential facility" doctrine might be traced
to the Terminal Railroad case. The Terminal Company controlled a bridge
across the Mississippi River, and the approaches and terminal at St. Louis,
which was a very significant junction point for competing railroads. That
company had every incentive to serve all railroads entering or leaving St.
Louis, charging whatever the market or any applicable rate regulation
would bear. 23 However, a coalition of railroads organized by Jay Gould
and others acquired the terminal and may have wished to use it to exclude
or prejudice rival railroads. 24 Rather than order dissolution of the
combination, with restoration of the Terminal Company's independence,
the Supreme Court required the members to admit their railroad
competitors to their consortium. 25 Although the Court did not use the word,
we might describe the Terminal Company's bridge, tracks, and terminals as
"essential facilities" that had to be shared with competitors.
But the Terminal Railroad decision itself proclaimed no such duty.
The Court's emphasis and reasoning were entirely upon the combination of
competitors acquiring control of the Terminal Company and excluding their
rivals from the combination. The alternatives mentioned by the Court were
only dissolution or expansion of the combination and did not include
dissolution accompanied by any requirement that an independent terminal
company deal in any particular way with the railroads.
In addition, the peculiar facts of Terminal Railroad should be noted.
The Terminal Company's St. Louis monopoly was apparently "natural" in
the double sense that its minimum efficient scale could accommodate all
the traffic, and that topographical features of the terrain made construction
of an alternative impossible or prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the
facilities were "essential" in the bottleneck sense: substantial competition
over extensive railroad networks on each side of St. Louis might be
22. United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1912); insofar as the decision
involved a concerted refusal to deal, see 12 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &2221b1
(2d ed. 2005).
23. Were it able to discriminate, it might charge less to those railroads that could cross
the river elsewhere.
24. For a brief history of the controversy, see David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit,
Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal
Monopoly?, 33 J.L. & Econ. 419 (1990); see also Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak,
Essential Facilities, 51 Stan.L.Rev. 1187 (1999).
25. 224 U.S. at 410-411.
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prevented through control of a few miles of track at this strategic location.
The Terminal Railroad Court's concern was solely with the
competitors of the defendant combination. Had the Terminal Company
remained independent, or had the combination been required to divest it,
its facilities would have been no less essential to the several railroads, but
they were not competitors of an independent Terminal Company, which
had no economic incentive to harm any of the railroads serving St. Louis. It
might have behaved arbitrarily or unwisely toward some or all of them, but
market pressures would tend to push it toward efficient decisions without
management by the Court. In sum, a rule permitting all affected railroads to
share the bottleneck facilities on equal terms tended to minimize the
operating costs of all railroads and left them free to compete with one
another in those parts of the market where competition was appropriate.
The Court did not need to inquire into the combination's intention,
for admission of other railroads was consistent with the rationale for the
combination -- joint ownership by the users of common facilities. Nor did
judicial interference compromise any efficiencies or chill any desirable or
pro-competitive activity. The defendants had not built or created anything
except a combination to take over existing facilities. Requiring admission
of other railroads could not impair the utility of the takeover (unless the
combination's rationale was the anticompetitive one of injuring its rivals).
Furthermore, given that the terminal was a combination to begin
with, the Court developed the easily administrable remedy of admitting
rivals to the combination on the same terms as existing members were
admitted. This is in sharp contrast to the facility controlled by the
monopolist, where forcing the sale says nothing about the price at which
the sale must be made, and may be impossible without judicial
administration of prices.
Even the most ardent interventionist does not usually claim that an
individual monopoly should be required to give or sell an equity interest in
itself to actual or would-be competitors. By contrast, a joint venture such
as the railroad terminal could presumably be opened to additional
members with relative ease. These points add up to relative clarity of the
legal rule. Competitors contemplating joint acquisition of a preexisting
monopoly know what their duties are to their rivals, as do subsequent
courts applying the Terminal Railroad ruling.
Associated Press. 26 Though more complex in several dimensions,
26. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See also 12 Antitrust Law
&2221b2; and Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995
Columbia Bus. L. Rev. 1.

10

Hovenkamp, Unilateral Refusals

the Associated Press case also involved a combination. Some 1,200
newspapers created the Associated Press, both (1) as a vehicle for
transmitting and exchanging among themselves news reports generated by
the members and by certain foreign publications and (2) as a new
enterprise that would generate news reports through its own employees at
such centers as Washington and London. Because of the resulting scale
economies and the skill with which it performed its tasks, the Associated
Press became very successful. It welcomed new members to provide
additional news input and to share its costs, but allowed existing members
to obstruct the admission of rival newspapers -- for example, of another
afternoon paper in the same city. Although the competition of other news
gathering organizations -- including United Press, International News
Service, Reuters, and many others -- meant that the Associated Press was
probably not a monopoly, it nevertheless commanded a sizeable market
share. 27
The Supreme Court held that the Associated Press' discriminatory
admission policy violated the '1 proscription of unreasonable
combinations. The Court expressly distinguished market power attributable
to individual activity from that arising from a combination of existing
competitors. 28 The Court did not reach the question whether AP was
obliged to admit any newcomers at all. Although Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion agreed with the divided lower court that a business
clothed in a public interest must deal with all, 29 the Court expressly
disclaimed any such "public utility concept." 30 Rather, the court required
AP to admit on terms that did not discriminate against newspapers that
competed with existing AP members.
Even if AP were read to require the organization to admit others,
one can hardly build any general duty to deal upon it. The Court dealt only
with the combination before it under '1 and specifically disclaimed reliance
on any public utility-type duty under '2. Moreover, although the
collaborators created a productive new enterprise for exchanging and
generating news reports, their rationale of shared economies of scale
27. See 52 F. Supp. at 366:
81 percent of the morning newspapers of the United States are members, and 59
percent of the evening newspapers; the aggregate of circulation of these
newspapers is 96 percent of the total circulation of morning newspapers in the
United States, and 77 percent of that of the evening newspapers.
28. 326 U.S. at 15.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id. at 19.

Hovenkamp, Unilateral Refusals

11

seemed consistent with admitting new members; admission sacrificed no
efficiencies and chilled no desirable activities. Two possible inconsistencies
seem insubstantial. (1) A member would not want its own news reports
used by a local rival. And even if the former's reports could not be
duplicated once the event had passed, requiring one to share its own news
reports with rivals diminishes the competitive reward from covering local
news and therefore chills the incentive to do so. But this problem is easily
solved, for members could exclude access to news generated by local
rivals and still allow access to AP-generated news -- that is, a "less
restrictive alternative" than outright exclusion of competing papers was
available. 31 (2) Without the exclusive local right to AP-generated news,
perhaps there would have been no impulse to create the Associated Press
in the first place. However, there were in fact competing members. Further,
as the lower court emphasized, some newspapers used no particular wire
service dispatch at all; of those who did, some printed the text verbatim,
some edited it or combined it with other sources, and some used their own
headlines. 32 In any event, the real value of AP membership was as a
mechanism for obtaining news from remote sources.
Note also that the defendant here, like the one in Terminal Railroad,
could take in additional members without either displacing existing users or
adding significantly to existing facilities. 33 More importantly, the remedy
was relatively simple: the combination was simply forbidden from
discriminatorily denying admission to competitors of members. No more
complex order was made by the Court. 34 Furthermore, if AP were
regarded as an essential facility to which admission was to be compelled,
only competitors of the AP's owners were accorded any protection by the
Court. Finally, although AP's service was not a monopoly, the case hardly
means that any distinctive service or product must be made available to
competitors. The lower court emphasized the peculiar importance to our
society of news reports, and the Supreme Court emphasized concerted
action "bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the

31. On the relevance of less restrictive alternatives in joint venture cases under the rule
of reason, see 7 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp &1505 (2d ed. 2004), 11 id.
&1913.
32. 52 F. Supp. at 372. Moreover, many newspapers used multiple wire services. For
example, of the thousand or so United Press subscribers, about a third were AP members.
33. I.e., because the relevant input was intellectual property it could be expanded
(which involves only duplication of the news story) without limit.
34. Had the AP then closed its membership ranks against all newcomers, it would
become necessary somehow to define the conditions of membership if the Court were to
require admission--the public utility concept that the Court expressly declined to reach.
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things in which the groups compete." 35
"Unilateral" cases: Griffith 36 and Otter Tail. 37 The Griffith decision is
best known for its controversial "leverage" dictum that "the use of monopoly
power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful." 38 If
construed literally, that formulation appears to condemn all vertical
integration by the supplier of a vital component that gives it a competitive
advantage in a second-level market. For example, the dominant computer
maker who integrates forward into retailing or backward by making its own
disc drives thereby obtains a "competitive advantage" over independent
retailers or disc drive makers and acts unlawfully. It would be strange to
invest with such weight these words pronounced in a case that had nothing
to do with vertical integration and that certainly did not discuss either such
integration or absolute refusals to deal.
Griffith dealt with a claim that a dominant owner of movie theaters
with a monopoly in some towns used its bargaining position to force movie
producers to impose unfavorable terms on competing theaters in other
towns. No claim was made that the defendant must supply the competing
theaters with anything. Further, the remedy may not have required judicial
administration of prices and terms, but only an injunction forbidding the
defendant from interfering in the contract terms of others. On the other
hand, ordering the defendant to behave in the competitive towns as if it had
no monopoly in other towns would be irrational, and presumably it would
use its competitive advantage to obtain deals that competitive theaters
could not match. In any event, neither the facts of the case nor the
resolution imposed any constraints whatsoever on vertical integration. The
Griffith dicta are often quoted out of this important context. 39
35. 326 U.S. at 15.
36. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
37. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
38. 334 U.S. at 107. See 3 Antitrust Law &652.
39. To like effect is Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1927), which only upon the most superficial reading imposes a general duty on a
manufacturing monopolist to be its downstream rivals' supplier. In fact, the allegations were
that the defendant had entered into a "combination" with numerous other firms, in part
"brought about by purchasing and acquiring the control of competing companies engaged in
manufacturing [photographic] materials; that it engaged in exclusive dealing arrangements
and unlawful resale price maintenance; and that, only after failing to acquire the plaintiff as it
had the plaintiffs' other rivals, it refused to deal with it as part of this overall monopolization
scheme. Id. at 368-369. The refusal to supply rivals was only a small portion of an overall
scheme that involved at least some concerted activity and that, in any event, the Court
regarded as aggressively monopolistic.
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The Otter Tail case also included compulsory dealing claims. A
monopolist of electric transmission lines, who also generated power and
distributed it to ultimate consumers, refused to supply or "wheel" power to
municipalities that undertook to operate their own retail distribution facilities
rather than franchising Otter Tail to sell directly to consumers. The Court
appeared to ground its condemnation on the Griffith formula, which was not
further elaborated or discussed, and on the defendant's undoubted
purpose to create or maintain a retail monopoly. But that reasoning is not
very helpful, given that any refusal to sell an essential good or service
necessarily produces monopoly at another level. Perhaps the Court meant
to condemn only those unjustified refusals that enhance monopoly power
rather than serve other legitimate objectives. If so, one might understand
the Court's invocation of an exclusionary or monopolistic purpose to
contain an implicit reservation "solely for an exclusionary purpose."
The peculiarities of Otter Tail should be noted. The defendant
possessed a natural monopoly. This monopoly was partially regulated in
ways that may have allowed it to operate to the detriment of consumers
through vertical integration. Thirdly, the case ought to be read in light of
strong historical formulations from the common law imposing broad duties
to deal on public utilities. Fourthly, there existed a nonjudicial agency (at
that time, the Federal Power Commission) accustomed to regulating both
the prices and terms of dealing of transmission monopolists; in this case,
however, as a result of an omission in the Federal Power Act that agency
lacked the authority to order wheeling of wholesale power, and the Court
took used antitrust to fill this regulatory vacuum. 40 As a result, Otter Tail is
quite distinguishable from the Supreme Court's subsequent Trinko
decision, where federal and state regulators had all the power to issue and
had issued the dealing orders that the plaintiff was requesting, as well as
the power to remedy violations.

40. Id. at 241. The omission was a "common carrier" provision applying to wholesale
power, that would have required regulated utilities to acts as transport agencies for one
another's power. On the somewhat broader antitrust duty of regulated firms to deal, see 3B
Antitrust Law &787.
Finally, the Court's analysis was driven in part by '1 considerations: Otter Tail had
provision contracts with another agency, the Bureau of Reclamation, and alleged that these
contracts forbad it from providing wheeling services to the municipalities in question. The
Supreme Court approved a district court finding that these contracts created vertical
territorial divisions unlawful under '1. To be sure, the Court nowhere stated that '2 liability
depended on the '1 violation, but the latter violation was clearly important nonetheless.
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Aspen. 41
Although the Supreme Court in Aspen did not rest on the essential
facility doctrine, as the Tenth Circuit below had, its decision has had
considerable influence on both unilateral refusal to deal doctrine and
essential facility claims.
Plaintiff Highlands and defendant Ski Co. operated rival skiing
facilities in Aspen, Colorado, a so-called destination ski resort, which
mainly served not local residents but skiers who traveled there from
elsewhere in the state, the nation and even other parts of the world. Of the
four skiing mountains in Aspen, Ski Co. operated on three and Highlands
on one. Ski Co. enjoyed more than 80 percent of the Aspen ski
revenues. 42
The antitrust dispute arose out of Ski Co.'s and Highland's
agreement to issue a joint "all Aspen" ski ticket that entitled skiers to use
any of the four mountains owned by the two firms. Tickets to use a firm's
ski lifts can be sold on a daily basis, but many firms offer multi-day tickets
at a discount below the daily rate. For example, when the daily rate was
$132, a six-day ticket was sold for $114, a saving of about 14 percent as
compared with the daily rate. In addition, the all-Aspen multi-day ticket
issued by the joint venture allowed patrons to ski on any of the four
mountains in Aspen.
Initially, Highlands and Ski Co. divided revenues from the multi-area
ticket by estimating usage of their respective facilities, as monitored by ski
lift operators. Highlands generally received 16 to 18 percent of the
revenues, although in one year its share dropped to 13.2 percent. For the
1977-78 season, Ski Co. offered to continue this joint arrangement only if
Highlands would accept 13.2 percent of revenues as its share, regardless
of actual usage; the parties worked out an agreement for that year at a
higher rate. Thereafter, Ski Co. became increasingly dissatisfied, attempted
to reduce Highlands' share again, and finally made an offer that Highlands
would and did find unacceptable.

41. See note _.
42. Nevertheless the defendant was very likely not a monopolist, for it competed for the
bulk of its patronage with other destination ski resorts. But because market issues had not
been properly preserved for appeal, the parties and the Supreme Court accepted the finding
that Ski Co. possessed an "Aspen only" monopoly. On the highly problematic market
definition see 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp &533g (2d ed. 2007). The fact
that the two parties subsequently merged into a single firm without challenge also suggests
a market significantly larger than Aspen itself.
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Once the four-area ticket was ended, Ski Co. marketed its own
three-area ticket. 43 When Highlands attempted to market its own multiarea ticket that included coupons exchangeable for Ski Co.'s day tickets at
the going rate for day tickets, Ski Co. refused to accept the coupons, which
were backed by funds at a local bank and were freely accepted by other
Aspen merchants. Ski Co. also refused to sell day tickets to Highlands at
the discounts it granted tour operators and indeed refused to sell Highlands
any tickets at all. Highlands' share of Aspen revenues dropped steadily,
reaching 11 percent in 1980-81, the year after the antitrust complaint was
filed.
Ski Co.'s justifications for abandoning the joint marketing venture
were not persuasive. Ski Co. said that it was dissatisfied with the ways in
which actual usage of the multi-area tickets was determined, but it rejected
Highlands' offer to engage well-known accountants at its own expense to
survey usage. Ski Co. said that it refused to accept Highlands' coupons
because of the administrative burden of processing them, although there
was no indication that such processing was more administratively
burdensome than Ski Co.'s acceptance of credit card charges.
The outside observer would understand that Ski Co. abandoned the
joint marketing arrangement with Highlands in order to increase its own
revenues. Because Ski Co.'s three mountains offered skiers a wide choice
of terrain, Ski Co. probably calculated that those coming to Aspen for a ski
week would prefer a discounted six-day ticket for Ski Co.'s three mountains
over a discounted six-day ticket at Highlands and over non-discounted day
tickets allowing them to ski at Highlands on some days and at Ski Co.'s
mountains on other days. This might seem a form of quasi-exclusive
dealing--manipulating the price structure of the single day and multi-day
tickets in a way that gave skiers a discount for not skiing at Highlands.
Under Lorain Journal 44 -- a case heavily relied on by the Supreme Court on
the issue of specific intent -- it clearly would have been illegal for Ski Co. to
sell lift tickets only to skiers who agreed not to purchase from Highlands.
The price structure adopted by Ski Co. might be thought to have a similar
practical effect. That would explain liability without any need for a showing
of essential facility.
The Aspen court did not directly analyze the case in these terms.
Instead, the district judge instructed the jury, as the Supreme Court
summarized, that the monopolization offense consisted of the possession
of monopoly power and "the willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that
43. On the assumption that the four-area ticket was generally more attractive to skiers
than a three-area ticket, one might suppose that total output in the market would decline.
44. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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power by anticompetitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or
exclusionary purposes." 45 The district judge elaborated that a monopolist
is not:
under a duty to cooperate with its business rivals. Also a company
which possesses monopoly power and which refuses to enter a
joint operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise refuses to
deal with a competitor in some manner does not violate '2 if valid
business reasons exist for that refusal. ... We are concerned with
conduct which unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors. ...
To sum up, you must determine whether Aspen Skiing Corporation
gained, maintained, or used monopoly power in a relevant market
by arrangements and policies which rather than being a
consequence of a superior product, superior business sense, or
historic element, were designed primarily to further any domination
of the relevant market or submarket. 46
The jury then answered in a specific query that Ski Co. had "willfully
acquired, maintained or used monopoly power by anticompetitive or
exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes, rather
than primarily as a consequence of a superior product, superior business
sense, or historic accident." 47
Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed on the grounds (1) that the multi-day, multi-area ticket was an
"essential facility" that Ski Co. had a duty to market jointly with Highlands
and (2) that there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury finding that
Ski Co.'s intention was to create or maintain a monopoly. Without reaching
the first ground, the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court began by declaring that a monopolist has no unqualified
duty to cooperate with rivals but that non-cooperation may "have
evidentiary significance." 48 Although the Court did not indicate what it was
that the refusal to deal might be evidence of, it turned immediately to
exclusionary intention, observing that a monopolist's "intent is merely
relevant to the question whether the challenged conduct is fairly
characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'anticompetitive.'" The Court thus
seemed to say that non-dealing may be evidence of an anticompetitive
intent, which in turn helps characterize the non-dealing as exclusionary or
45. 472 U.S. at 595-596.
46. Id. at 597.
47. Id. at 597-598 n.21.
48. Id. at 601.
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anticompetitive. At the same time, the Court characterized noncooperation as anticompetitive not because of the defendant's state of
mind but because of evidence that "interchangeable tickets are used in
other multi-mountain areas which apparently are competitive." 49
The defendant's important change from cooperation with rivals to
non-cooperation was not necessarily anticompetitive, but the jury found
that it was, apparently concluding that there were no "valid business
reasons" for the defendant's conduct -- a conclusion the Court held to be
adequately supported. The defendant's justifications were unpersuasive.
The refusal deprived consumers of an option they preferred. Ski Co.'s
refusal to accept Highlands' coupons sacrificed short-run revenue 50 and
thus allowed the inference "that it was more interested in reducing
competition in the Aspen market over the long-run by harming its smaller
competitors" and this was "a deliberate effort to discourage its customers
from doing business with its smaller rival." Its own "three-area six-day
ticket, particularly when it was discounted below the daily ticket price,
deterred the ticket holders from skiing at Highlands." The Court concluded
that "the evidence supports an inference that Ski Company was not
motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice shortrun benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run
impact on its smaller rival." The Court went so far as to say that exclusion
of rivals "on some basis other than efficiency" is "predatory." 51
Of course it may be that marketing of ski tickets enjoys some
economies of scale. The cost of advertising in national ski magazines, for
example, would be lower per lift ticket for the 80 percent firm than for a 20
percent firm. However to reason from that premise to a conclusion
compelling joint advertising cuts very broadly. We do not ordinarily require
large firms to include the offerings of their rivals in their advertisements.
This conclusion is not changed by the larger firm's knowledge that, if forced
49. Id. at 603.
50. It seems doubtful that a refusal to deal would, even in the short-run, reduce Ski
Co.'s revenues. Although Ski Co. might lose the revenues of a particular skier who had
already taken a six-day ticket at Highlands, its business calculation was doubtless that its
short-run revenues during the current season would be higher with a three-area ticket than
with a four-area ticket. Furthermore, the success of this strategy does not in any way
depend upon the destruction of Highlands, although its profits would almost certainly be
higher if Highlands were forced out of business.
51. Id. at 602-603. The plaintiff also objected to Ski Co.'s advertisements exhibiting
four peaks in Aspen but naming only the three that it controlled. The plaintiff alleged that
such advertising misled consumers into believing that there were only three rather than four
skiing mountains there. The Court observed that this evidence was consistent with its own
conclusion even though it would not itself be sufficient to sustain the judgment. Id. at 611
n.43.
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to advertise separately, the smaller firm has significantly higher per unit
advertising costs than the larger firm.
The Court also did not worry that joint marketing by the only two
firms in the assumed Aspen market could easily facilitate price fixing
among them. The two firms could simply have estimated the profitmaximizing monopoly price for a four-area ticket and charged accordingly
on their individual day tickets. Indeed, the Colorado Attorney General had
previously filed a complaint against the two companies under Sherman Act
'1 and had obtained a consent decree under which the parties were
permitted to participate in joint marketing provided "they set their own ticket
prices unilaterally before negotiating its terms." 52
In sum, although no general or absolute duty was imposed on a
monopolist to deal with or cooperate with actual or would-be competitors,
any of its actions might be condemned if the jury finds that it "willfully"
acquired, maintained, or used monopoly power "by anticompetitive or
exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes." 53
Such means or purposes were contrasted with "valid" or "legitimate
business reasons." The Court's logic was apparently that legitimate
business reasons prevent the characterization of the defendant's behavior
or purpose as anticompetitive or exclusionary.
Aspen's problematic reach and potential limitations
The Aspen case shares with essential facility cases the fact that it
involves vertical integration. 54 The input in this case is promotion, and the
plaintiffs' claim was that antitrust requires participation in a joint venture
that reduced promotion's per user costs. The peculiarity is that Aspen was
not the typical essential facility case where one firm is vertically integrated,
the other is not, and the second firm wishes the first firm to be forced to
share its internally produced input.
The jury instructions given in Aspen invite courts to reach too
broadly. 55 Consider several examples. (1) When a monopolist refuses to
license its patent, would the Court say that there is no general duty to
52. Id. at 591 n.9.
53. Id. at 595-596 (emphasis added).
54. See 3B Antitrust Law &771a.
55. For example, see Sunshine Cellular v. Vanguard Cellular Sys., Inc., 810 F. Supp.
486 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting Aspen to require a firm to deal with a competitor if its
refusal was designed to enable it "to gain a competitive advantage" in its market).
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license but that the refusal may nevertheless be condemned if the
monopolist acted with the anticompetitive effect or purpose of limiting
competition with itself? Indeed, is it not likely that every refusal to license
has such a purpose or effect? 56 (2) When a monopolist opposes a wouldbe rival's licensing by a regulatory agency, might the Aspen Court say that
there is no general duty to refrain from political action but that lobbying may
be condemned if the jury finds an anticompetitive purpose or effect? 57 (3)
When a newspaper monopolist refuses to supply independent dealers with
the product, might the Aspen Court say that there is no general duty to
supply would-be competitors at the distribution level but that the refusal to
do so may be condemned if the effect or purpose is anticompetitive or
exclusionary? Again, it certainly is exclusionary in the lay sense of
eliminating rivals in the distribution of a "monopoly" newspaper. (4) When a
monopolist refuses to predisclose the results of its research and
development, would the Aspen Court say that there is no general or
absolute duty to predisclose but that the failure to do so might be
condemned if a jury finds that the effect or purpose is anticompetitive or
exclusionary? 58 It seems obvious, of course, that such a monopolist
intends to retain as much of the market for itself as possible, just as the
defendant did in Aspen.
Permitting such conclusions sends juries off on a wide ranging hunt
for anticompetitive intent in circumstances where such "intent" can always
be found. In concentrated markets the intent to maintain or improve one's
own market position always entails the knowledge that rivals must suffer.
Of course, the Aspen Court did not consider the implications for other
situations of the jury instructions it approved. It surely did not intend to
legislate on so grand a scale as to subject all the preceding illustrations to
a jury's policy decision upon a monopolist's duty to deal or cooperate with
rivals. Furthermore, the Aspen Court's own formulation is itself qualified in
several ways.
First, some of our examples involve conduct that may be regarded
as absolutely privileged. For example, political action or a refusal to license
a patent seem absolutely privileged, as does the refusal to give rivals the
benefit of one's R & D. Indeed, the rationale for such a privilege respecting
R & D is that burdening individual research and development with any duty
56. The Ninth Circuit thought not in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
Inc., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998); see 3 Antitrust Law
&709b (3d ed. 2008).
57. See 1 Phillip E.Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &202 (3d ed. 2006)
(non-sham political action privileged without regard to petitioner's intent).
58. See 3B Antitrust Law &776b.

20

Hovenkamp, Unilateral Refusals

to share it with rivals would reduce the incentives for it and therefore tend
to chill that desirable activity. 59 Much the same could be said of the other
examples given above. Antitrust law does not wish to discourage firms from
building optimal size plants or warehouses by threatening their builders
with any duty to share what might be regarded as excess or available
capacity. Although the same point might be made about independently
developed advertising, promotion, or weekly ski lift tickets -- that is, forcing
a monopolist to share successful promotion or marketing tools attractive to
consumers might chill the incentives for undertaking them -- we might
distinguish Aspen's multi-area ticket developed not by the monopolist alone
but jointly with its competitors.
Second, the Aspen Court made much of the defendant's important
change in long-standing arrangements, whose prior existence in this and
other markets indicate that they satisfy consumer desire and are optimally
efficient. This would not be the case for most demands for access to a
monopolist's goods, services, or facilities. Although a shift from individual
distribution to self-distribution does alter preexisting arrangements, the
supplier making such a shift usually has good business reasons for doing
so.
Third, Aspen does not consider or define the terms on which
dealing might take place. It certainly does not hold that a monopolist must
make its goods, services, or facilities available at a competitive rather than
a monopolistic price. 60 Indeed it is generally assumed that an otherwise
lawful monopolist does not violate the statute by charging a monopoly
price. So, even if a monopolist were obliged to make a patent or its
research available, it could charge the full monopoly price.
Fourth, given that a monopolist may charge a monopoly price for
anything it provides, its refusal to make the product available need not
have any detrimental price-output effects and therefore would not be
"anticompetitive" in purpose or effect. Although it still might be
"exclusionary" in a lay sense, that term in antitrust parlance designates
59. See 3B Antitrust Law &&776, 781 (3d ed. 2008).
60. Distinguishing the monopoly price from one that exceeds the monopoly price and
therefore that is equivalent to refusing to sell at all will be difficult, and may suggest that it is
unwise for the antitrust court to adopt legal rules whose administration depends on such
distinctions. We therefore question the holding in Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991) that
an essential facility violation can be established by a willingness to deal only on
"unreasonable" terms -- in this case, by an insistence that the defendant railroad make just
as much money from a shared arrangement as it would have made if it had served the
customer alone. Evaluating that claim necessarily puts the court in the position of a price
regulatory agency.
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acts that the law deems improperly anticompetitive, and thus would not
cover behavior which the law deems not to be offensively anticompetitive.
Fifth, the facts before the Court, as well as the formulations used,
make clear that only that conduct affecting competition in the monopolist's
market was covered. Thus, a monopolist's behavior affecting competition
among its independent customers is not addressed by the Aspen ruling.
Sixth, and fundamental, Aspen leaves monopolists free to refuse to
deal or cooperate with rivals for legitimate business reasons. 61 Observe,
moreover, that the Court did not call for any balancing of the social gains
from refusing to deal or cooperate with rivals based on legitimate business
purposes against the losses resulting from that refusal. Rather, the Court
classified conduct or intention as either lawful or not on the basis of the
presence or absence of legitimate business purposes. Of course, the
Court's proposition generates several subordinate questions. (1) What
constitutes a legitimate business purpose? By what criteria is it to be
determined? (2) Does the defendant have not only the burden of coming
forward with evidence of a legitimate business purpose but also the burden
of persuasion on that issue? If so, it would be much simpler to rule that
monopolists are always obliged to deal or cooperate unless the challenged
conduct is either privileged or affirmatively justified by legitimate business
purposes. (3) Is the jury relatively untrammeled in making the policy
decision as to what constitutes a legitimate business purpose, or only
whether the challenged conduct in fact serves it, or whether the defendant
reasonably believed that the challenged conduct served an objective that
either the judge or the jury determines to be legitimate? (4) As the last
question implies, are we to focus on the defendant's state of mind or on the
objective question whether the challenged conduct actually serves a
legitimate purpose?
As elaborated elsewhere, we would approve only that part of the
above quoted jury instructions stating that a monopolist commits an
unlawful exclusionary practice when it engages in conduct "which
unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors," 62 analyzed under an
objective test. Condemnation would be appropriate only for conduct that
(1) clearly injures an actual or prospective rival either (2a) with no good
business justification at all, or (2b) with a business justification that is poorly
fitted to the result or wholly disproportionate to the harm that is inflicted.
Finally, the conduct must be capable of creating or sustaining a

61. On business justification defenses in '2 cases generally, see 3 Antitrust Law &658f
(3d ed. 2008).
62. Aspen, note _ at 597.
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monopoly. 63
Aspen remedy contrasted with "essential facility" remedies generally
On the one hand, Aspen resembles a modern essential facility case
in that the Supreme Court required the defendant to supply an essential
input to its rivals. On the other hand, the case is significantly different
because of the idiosyncratic nature of the input at issue. The marketing
joint venture between the plaintiff and the defendant was produced by the
parties jointly; they shared revenues in proportion to market share, and
presumably shared expenses in the same proportion. To this end, the
terms were more-or-less self-executing and apparently required little
ongoing judicial supervision. 64
This should be contrasted with the essential facility case where the
defendant produces the claimed essential input exclusively and the plaintiff
wants to purchase it, generally at some unestablished "reasonable" price.
Trinko
In Trinko the Second Circuit embraced the extension of the
essential facility doctrine to a situation in which dealing with rivals may
have required the defendant to construct additional facilities or hire
additional employees. 65 The plaintiff, a competitive local exchange carrier,
63. See 3 Antitrust Law &651.
64. However, the case left unresolved such important administrative issues as how
revenues should be split, what kinds of information would be used to determine revenue
splits and the like.
65. Law, Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
See also Covad Conmmunic. Co. v. Bellsouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2002), vacated, 540 U.S. 1147 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 904 (2005) (responding to
defendant's attack on essential facility doctrine as inconsistent with antitrust principles by
stating that "[w]e are not authorized to abrogate doctrines that have been endorsed and not
yet rejected by the Supreme Court," quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc. v.
Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996)).
See also Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Corecomm Newco, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 810 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (refusing to dismiss essential facility claim by CLEC); Davis v. Pacific Bell Tel. Co.,
204 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (consumers had standing to claim that ILEC violated
antitrust laws by causing service disruptions to "migrating" customers C that is, those in the
process of switching service to other carriers).
Contrast Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 201 F.Supp.2d 123
(D.D.C. 2002),aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 398 F.3d 666 (D.C.Cir. 2005) (plaintiff's allegations
were essentially of violations of Telecommunications Act); Cavalier Telephone, LLC v.
Verizon Virginia, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va. 2002), aff'd, 300 F.3d 176 (4th Cir.
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or CLEC, claimed that the defendant Bell Atlantic (now Verizon) had failed
to fulfill its orders for interconnection capacity sufficiently quickly, in part
because of understaffing in its order-filling office, and had discriminated
against competitive carriers in supplying new capacity. 66 While these
practices if true as alleged could violate the Communications Act or the
interconnection agreement between Verizon and competitive carriers, the
court also found that they stated an antitrust claim for denial of an essential
facility.
Further, many of the facilities the plaintiffs sought were generally
covered by FCC rules that required them to be sold at very low prices. 67
Recognizing an essential facility violation in these circumstances may
require a firm to give up profitable retail business that it already has in
order to make less profitable wholesale transfers to a reselling rival. If a
CEO intentionally abandoned profitable retail business in favor of less
profitable wholesale business he would justifiably be fired. 68
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1148 (2004) (similar); Stein v. Pacific Bell Tel. Co., 173
F.Supp.2d 975 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 172 Fed.Appx. 192 (9th Cir.
Mar. 22, 2006) (similar; DSL services); Goldwasser v Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 399
(7th Cir. 2000) (similar). Cf. United States Telecom Assn. v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 427 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 940 (2003) ("Scholars have raised very serious
questions about the wisdom of the essential facilities doctrine as a justification for judicial
mandates of competitor access").
66. See also Covad, 299 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (alleging that defendant
"strategically understaffed" its order-filling department for interconnection services, with the
result that the plaintiff suffered an order backlog).
67. See Verizon Communications v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002), which approved on
facial challenge an order that requires ILECs to share inputs with CLECs at the most
efficient competitive price that would be charged for the lowest cost technology, rather than
a price that reflects the ILEC's actual historical cost or the price that would obtain in an
unregulated market. The result, as the Supreme Court described it, is:
an explicit disavowal of the familiar public-utility model of rate regulation (whether in its
fair-value or cost-of-service incarnations) ... in favor of novel rate setting designed
to give aspiring competitors every possible incentive to enter local retail telephone
markets, short of confiscating the incumbents' property.
Id. at 489.
68. For these reasons the Sherman Act has never required a firm to make an
unprofitable sale or forego profitable sales in order to make less profitable sales to a
competitor. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608 (condemning refusal to deal that was not "justified
by any normal business purpose"; defendant "elected to forgo" the immediate profits of
ticket sales "because it was more interested in reducing competition ... by harming its
smaller competitor").
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 451, 460
(1992) (refusal would be lawful if supported by a "business justification"); and on remand,
125 F.3d 1195,1212-1213 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998) ("When a
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Finally, the Telecommunications Act gives CLECs a choice
between leasing access to a particular input from the incumbent carrier or
providing the input for itself. As a result, some CLECs provide certain
hardware or capacity for themselves while others lease the same hardware
or capacity from the incumbent. But antitrust's essential facility doctrine
knows no such distinction. A particular facility or input is not "essential"
simply because one particular firm would prefer to rent it from the
monopoly rather than provide it for itself. Rather, it must be shown that
rivals in general are unable to duplicate the facility. 69
Confining the essential facility doctrine to cases involving
"unjustified" refusals serves in some measure to distinguish the competitive
goals of the antitrust laws from more interventionist regulatory regimes.
"Unjustified" refusals make economic sense only because of their adverse
impact on rivals. As a result, such refusals are relatively rare C most firms
would be willing to sell unused capacity at a profit C and relatively easy to
identify. But to use the antitrust laws to compel "irrational" dealing C that is,
dealing that is less profitable than alternative sales of the same resources
C could turn every monopolist into a utility and condemn it even when it
was serving every customer it could possibly reach. It also places the
antitrust tribunal even more firmly in the position of public utility regulator,
forcing firms to make judgments that an unregulated firm would not make.
Complaints alleging the denial of shared access to an existing input
legitimate business justification supports a monopolist's exclusionary conduct, that conduct
does not violate '2 of the Sherman Act"); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366, 378 (1978) (defendant refused to sell power at profitable rates to adjacent utilities for
sole purpose of destroying them). See also Cities o f Anaheim, Cal., et al. v. Southern Ca.
Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir.1992) (duty to deal arises only "when there is no
justification for refusing to aid a competitor"); State of Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1483 n.13 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094
(1992) (defendant's wish to protect itself from "added costs or lost profits" provides business
justification defense to essential facility claim); Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources,
Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988) (legitimate business
justification immunizes monopolist against essential facility claim); Olympia Equip. Leasing
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934
(1987) (essential facility doctrine requires showing of absence of business justification);
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 540 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding essential facility
violation because defendant "had no legitimate business reason not to negotiate" with the
plaintiff ); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131-132
(D.D.C. 2002), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 398 F.3d 666 (D.C.Cir. 2005) (limiting essential
facility claim to refusals to deal that "lack a legitimate business justification").
69. See 3B Antitrust Law &773b; and see, e.g., International Audiotext Network v.
AT&T, 893 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff d, 62 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995) (AT&T's
international calling services were not an essential facility where other firms provided similar
services for themselves).
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with excess capacity are quite different from complaints requesting the
defendant to add additional capacity in the form of either hardware or
technical support. The essential facility doctrine has always been restricted
to the sharing of existing facilities said to be essential, and even such
orders strain the capacity of a federal court of general jurisdiction and place
it nearly in the shoes of the regulator. Requiring a defendant to expand its
facilities and determining the rate and scope of expansion and incremental
services that should be offered would make the antitrust role
indistinguishable from that of the regulator. 70
Antitrust essential facility claims should also be denied where a
state or federal agency has effective power to compel sharing and to
regulate its scope and terms. This seems implicit in the Supreme Court's
Otter Tail decision, which forced an electric utility to "wheel" power
because the statutory authorization to the Federal Power Commission
failed to give that agency the power to order wheeling. 71 Determining the
70. The Trinko complaint alleged that the defendant Bell Atlantic filled orders for
competitive carriers' customers only after filling the orders of its own customers. 305 F.3d at
95. In Covad, note __, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the essential facility doctrine is
limited to refusals to deal, but found a fact dispute about whether the defendant had in fact
refused. Covad, 299 F.3d at 1290 n.16.
Cf. Verizon New Jersey, Inc. v. Ntegrity Telecontent Svces., Inc., 219 F.Supp.2d
616 (D.N.J. 2002) (alleged breaches of interconnection agreement did not give rise to '2
claim; no claims of competitive injury; "[e]ssentially what is before this Court is Ntegrity's
disappointment with the interconnection agreements that it negotiated with Verizon"); Covad
Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Co., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd in
relevant part, 398 F.3d 666 (D.C.Cir. 2005) (plaintiff failed to state essential facility claim
because all the terms of dealing that it disputed were governed by the telecommunications
act rather than the antitrust laws:
The particular terms of that statutorily mandated access are now fully regulated by
the FCC and state commissions through their oversight and approval of detailed
interconnection agreements. In this setting, there can be no significant harm to
competition or anti-competitive effect as a matter of antitrust law, as every relevant
facet of Bell Atlantic's relationship with Covad is subject to regulation under the
1996 Act, the rulings of the FCC, and the affirmative and active supervision of state
public utility commissions charged with the 1996 Act's enforcement.
71. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-376 (1973):
As originally conceived, [the Federal Power Act] would have included a "common
carrier" provision making it "the duty of every public utility to ... transmit energy for
any person upon reasonable request.. . ." In addition, it would have empowered the
Federal Power Commission to order wheeling if it found such action to be
"necessary or desirable in the public interest." H.R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.;
S.1725, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. These provisions were eliminated to preserve "the
voluntary action of the utilities." S. Rep. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 ....
Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the limited authority of the Federal
Power Commission to order interconnections was intended to be a substitute for,
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scope and terms under which sharing must occur is a technically complex
task for which antitrust courts are ill suited, particularly via jury trials.
Indeed, the courts and the agencies themselves often disagree over the
appropriate scope and terms of sharing obligations. 72 Where the agency
unambiguously has the authority to order sharing and to supervise its
scope and terms, parallel antitrust intervention undermines the agency
prerogative and exposes parties to needless collateral attack in an area
where directly affected parties are entitled to full judicial review of agency
actions. Even in Otter Tail, the Supreme Court affirmed a decree that
compelled the wheeling that the then-existing Federal Power Act failed to
mandate, 73 but then transferred to the Federal Power Commission the
obligation to identify the scope and terms of the wheeling obligation. 74
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and severely
narrowed the antitrust duty of a monopolist to deal with rivals. 75 The Court
found "no need either to recognize or to repudiate" the essential facility
doctrine. 76 Its conclusions apply to all the legal theories for treating simple,
or unconditional, refusals to deal under '2 of the Sherman Act. 77
or to immunize Otter Tail from, antitrust regulation for refusing to deal with
municipal corporations....
72. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387-391 (1999) (Court and agency
disagreed over which network elements were "necessary" under statutory definition and
thus required to be shared); United States Telecom Assn, note __, 290 F.3d at 422-430
(similar).
73. See Otter Tail, note __ at 376:
So far as wheeling is concerned, there is no authority granted the Commission
under Part II of the Federal Power Act to order it, for the bills originally introduced
contained common carrier provisions which were deleted. The Act as passed
contained only the interconnection provision set forth in '202(b). The common
carrier provision in the original bill and the power to direct wheeling were left to the
"voluntary coordination of electric facilities." Insofar as the District Court ordered
wheeling to correct anticompetitive and monopolistic practices of Otter Tail, there is
no conflict with the authority of the Federal Power Commission.
74. Otter Tail, note __ at 376-377.
75. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398
(2004). Six Justices signed the Court's opinion, which was authored by Justice Scalia.
Three concurring Justices (Stevens, Souter, and Thomas) would also have dismissed the
complaint, but on grounds of standing. There were no dissents.
76. 540 U.S. at 880-881, citing Phillip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in
Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841 (1989).
77. "Conditional" refusals are of course different, such as when the monopolist
conditions dealing on the buyer's acceptance of a "tied" product (tying), or on the buyer's
promise not to deal with rivals (exclusive dealing), or on the buyer's promise to resell the
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As the Supreme Court summarized the alleged facts, the plaintiff
was a customer of AT&T, a competitive local exchange carrier, or CLEC.
Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act the defendant Verizon, an
incumbent local exchange carrier, or ILEC, was required to enter an
interconnection agreement providing for the sharing of its network elements
with any CLEC that requested such interconnection. 78 The antitrust
dispute arose when Verizon failed to provide such access in a timely
fashion. The plaintiff complained that the failure was not an oversight, but
rather was "part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers
from becoming or remaining customers" of CLECs. 79 The complaint
requested damages as well as a mandatory injunction ordering Verizon to
fill orders for new services from CLECs on the same terms and timing as it
took care of its own customers. 80
The Supreme Court declined to find an implied regulatory
immunity. 81 However, it did hold that the effectiveness of the regulatory
regime entailed that antitrust could at best effect only a "slight"
improvement in outcome, and that no improvement was likely when the
substantive offense was as difficult to administer as a claim of unilateral
refusal to deal.
The Court reiterated that the monopolization offense requires both
power and conduct:
It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, "the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
good at a specified price (resale price maintenance). These were not addressed by the
Court. The Court did cite one resale price maintenance case, United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), but only for the proposition that
the Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
78. On the regulatory environment, see 2A Antitrust Law &243.
79. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 404.
80. Ibid. The 1996 Telecommunications Act also requires CLECs to provide such
access on "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms." 47 U.S.C. '251(c)(3).
81. See 2A Antitrust Law &243g.
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business acumen, or historic accident." The mere possession of
monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices,
is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices C at least for a
short period C is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place;
it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied
by an element of anticompetitive conduct. 82

An overly expansive '2 duty to deal comes dangerously close to
being a form of "no-fault" monopolization if refusal to share productive
assets with rivals is the monopolist's only offense. 83 Apropos of this, the
Court noted the "tension" that exists whenever a court is asked to require a
monopolist to share its lawfully acquired inputs:
Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an
infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their
customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of their
advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of
antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist,
the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial
facilities. 84
Further, forced sharing blends the roles of antitrust court and
regulator:
Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central
planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of
dealing C a role for which they are ill-suited. 85
Further, noting an evil that was present C although not much
discussed C in Aspen Skiing, forced sharing requires firms to cooperate
rather than compete, and cooperation can "facilitate the supreme evil of
antitrust: collusion." 86 As a result, antitrust has traditionally been reluctant
82. 540 U.S. at 407, quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571
(1966).
83. See 3B Antitrust Law &771a.
84. 540 U.S. at 407.
85. Ibid.
86. Id. at 408, citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). See
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 591 n.9 (1985) (noting
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to impose sharing obligations even on proven monopolists. Nonetheless,
[u]nder certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with rivals can
constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate '2. We have been
very cautious in recognizing such exceptions, because of the
uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and
remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm. 87
The Court then described Aspen as being "at or near the outer
boundary of '2 liability." 88 Then it noted why the allegations in the present
case fell short of the facts that the Supreme Court had found sufficient in
Aspen. First,
[t]he unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably
profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake
short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end. Similarly, the
defendant's unwillingness to renew the ticket even if compensated
at retail price revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent. 89
By contrast, in the present case the "complaint does not allege that
Verizon voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals, or would
ever have done so absent statutory compulsion." 90
Second, because there was no previous voluntary dealing, "the
defendant's prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its refusal
to deal C upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by
competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice." 91 This was in contrast to
Aspen, where the defendant had voluntarily entered a joint venture with the
plaintiff and then pulled out of it, even though remaining in the venture was
clearly profitable. Indeed, defendant Ski Company had even refused to sell
to the plaintiff at its own retail price, "suggesting a calculation that its future

that the Colorado attorney general had filed a complaint alleging that the marketing joint
venture in question would provide the parties "with a forum for price fixing in violation of '1
of the Sherman Act"; the parties settled with a consent decree permitting the venture but
requiring them to set their prices individually).
87. Ibid.
88. ld. at 409.
89. Ibid. (Court's italics).
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
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monopoly retail price would be higher." 92 In sharp contrast, "Verizon's
reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate of compensation available
under [the Telecommunications Act,] '251(c)(3) tells us nothing about
dreams of monopoly." 93
The Court also observed that Aspen involved a situation in which
the defendant refused to sell something that "it already sold at retail" 94 in
any event. That also explained the Otter Tail case, where the defendant
simply refused to wholesale, or "wheel," power it was already generating
and transmitting at wholesale to others. 95 In the present case, however,
the services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or
available to the public. The sharing obligation imposed by the 1996
Act created "something brand new" C "the wholesale market for
leasing network elements." 96 The unbundled elements offered
pursuant to '251(c)(3) exist only deep within the bowels of Verizon;
they are brought out on compulsion of the 1996 Act and offered not
to consumers but to rivals, and at considerable expense and
effort. 97
Further,
[n]ew systems must be designed and implemented simply to make
that access possible C indeed, it is the failure of one of those
systems that prompted the present complaint. 98
As a result, "Verizon's alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of
service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under this Court's

92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Id. at 410. Following Trinko, see Stein v. Pacific Bell, 172 Fed.Appx. 192, 2006 WL
751812, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75287 (9th Cir. March 22, 2006, unpublished) (Trinko
foreclosed consumer refusal to interconnect claim against incumbent telephone carrier; no
refusal to deal case when product that plaintiff was seeking was not one that defendant
ordinarily sold at retail).
95. Ibid., citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
96. Ibid., citing Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 528 (2002).
97. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410.
98. Ibid.
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existing refusal-to-deal precedents." 99
As noted, the Court declined either to embrace or to repudiate the
essential facility doctrine itself. 100 Its restrictions on the law of unilateral
refusal to deal were written so as to apply to all unconditioned unilateral
refusals to deal, whether or not denominated as denials of an essential
facility. The Court did observe:
It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable
requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of access
to the "essential facilities"; where access exists, the doctrine serves
no purpose. Thus, it is said that "essential facility claims should ...
be denied where a state or federal agency has effective power to
compel sharing and to regulate its scope and terms." Respondent
believes that the existence of sharing duties under the 1996 Act
supports its case. We think the opposite: The 1996 Act's extensive
provision for access makes it unnecessary to impose a judicial
doctrine of forced access. To the extent respondent's "essential
facilities" argument is distinct from its general '2 argument, we
reject it. 101
The Supreme Court's opinion very severely limits the scope of
unlawful unilateral refusals to deal under '2 of the Sherman Act. The
limitations apply to both the "essential facility" doctrine and the refusal to
deal doctrine as articulated in Aspen Skiing.
First, before a unilateral refusal to deal is unlawful under '2, the
refusal must be "irrational" in the sense that the defendant sacrificed an
opportunity to make a profitable sale only because of the adverse impact
the refusal would have on a rival. 102 The Court found such a sacrifice in
Aspen, which Trinko declared to be "at or near the outer boundary" of '2
liability. 103 Aspen had condemned the refusal to deal because the
defendant had been willing to sacrifice immediate profits C even refusing to
make sales to its rival at its ordinary retail price C in order to exclude.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. An amicus brief filed by the government had urged the Court to adopt a test that a
refusal to deal is not unlawful unless it involves a short-run "sacrifice" of this nature. Brief for
the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
2003 WL 21269559 (May 23, 2003).
103. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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Trinko refused to condemn, because there was no evidence of such a
short-term sacrifice; in fact, the sales in question were made at steeply
discounted wholesale prices under price rules established by the FCC.
Presumably, it would have been at least as profitable for Verizon simply to
serve these customers directly at its usual retail prices. In any event, there
was no allegation to the contrary.
Second, the Court did not categorically restrict the realm of unlawful
refusals to situations in which the defendant had voluntarily established
and later repudiated a course of dealing with the plaintiff. But the Court
made the existence of a previous voluntarily relationship very close to
dispositive. Once again, considering Aspen to establish the 'outer
boundary" of liability, the Court noted that in Aspen the prior history of
dealing enabled the fact finder to draw inferences from the defendant's
change of behavior. 104 In the present case, by contrast, "the defendant's
prior conduct sheds no light upon the motivation of its refusal to deal C
upon whether its regulatory lapses were prompted not by competitive zeal
but by anticompetitive malice." 105 The Court appeared to leave barely
open the possibility that "anticompetitive malice" could be established by
means other than an unexplained, apparently irrational change in an
established course of dealing.
Third, the Court limited liability for refusal to deal to those situations
where the defendant was already selling some particular product or service
to others but refused to sell that same product or service to the plaintiff.
That is, the doctrine does not apply where the requested assets are "not
otherwise marketed or available to the public." 106 There is no duty to sell
something that the firm is using only internally, or to share some facility that
the firm is using for its own internal production but is not in the business of
sharing with others. On this point, the Court distinguished the Aspen and
Otter Tail cases from the present one:
In Aspen Skiing, what the defendant refused to provide to its
competitor was a product that it already sold at retail C to
oversimplify slightly, lift tickets representing a bundle of services to
skiers. Similarly, in Otter Tail.., another case relied upon by
respondent, the defendant was already in the business of providing
a service to certain customers (power transmission over its
104. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 604: "Ski Co.'s decision to terminate the all-Aspen ticket
was thus a decision by a monopolist to make an important change in the character of the
market."
105. Id. at 409.
106. Id. at 410.
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network), and refused to provide the same service to certain other
customers. In the present case, by contrast, the services allegedly
withheld are not otherwise marketed or available to the public. 107
On grounds of administrability alone, it is one thing to order a firm to
share something that it is already independently making and marketing to
others. It is quite another to order a firm to share an input that it has never
independently marketed at all. Such a decision much more clearly places
the antitrust tribunal in the position of regulatory agency, requiring collateral
decisions about the scope and terms of the forced sale.
The Court noted that this limitation to goods or inputs that the
defendant was already selling to others was consistent with the Supreme
Court's own precedents. However, lower courts had been more expansive,
and this limitation appears to overrule holdings in many lower court
decisions. For example, the stadium owner asked to share its facility, or the
pipeline asked to lease space, were very likely not in the business of
leasing out stadiums or pipeline space at all. Rather, their business was the
sale of athletic event tickets or natural gas transported through the
pipeline. 108 Even the venerable MCI decision in the Seventh Circuit
employed the essential facility doctrine to require AT&T to interconnect with
a rival, something that AT&T was not doing on the general market. 109
Fourth, the Court noted one reason for denying '2 liability in this
107. Ibid.
108. E.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusal to
share athletic stadium with rival); Consolidated Gas Co. of Fla, Inc. v. City Gas Co. of Fla,
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd, 880 F.2d 297 (11th Cir.), opinion vacated,
889 F.2d 264 (11th Cir.1989), on reh'g, 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir.1990), rev'd per curiam on
non-antitrust grounds, 499 U.S. 915 (1991) (refusal to share gas pipeline); Delaware &
Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 928 (1991) (refusal to share track with rival railroad, as opposed to transporting the
latter's cargo). The same thing very likely applies to cases holding that such things as
telephone subscriber lists demanded by competing producers of telephone directories are
essential facilities. Presumably a telephone company is not in the general business of
selling its subscriber list. See, e.g., Direct Media Corp. v. Camden Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 989 F. Supp. 1211 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (recognizing possible essential facility claim);
BellSouth Advertising v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) aff'd, 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated 977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir.
1992)(same). See also Great Western Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 63 F.3d
1378 (5th Cir. 1995), rev'd in part, 74 F.3d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 518 U.S. 1048
(1996). Likewise, one doubts that UPS is in the general business of selling use of its
package-tracking software to rival shippers. EVIC Class Action Litigation (Farina v. UPS),
2002 WL 1766554 (S.D.N.Y., July 31, 2002).
109. MCI Communic. Co. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 891 (1983), appeal after remand, 748 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1984).
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case was that "[n]ew systems must be designed and implemented simply
to make" the rival's request for access possible. 110 It is one thing to force a
firm to share out of its excess capacity, but quite another to order it to build
new facilities or expand existing facilities beyond their current capacity.
Once again, such orders place enormous additional "regulatory" burdens
on courts. The Telecommunications Act imposes such requirements, but
strictly in the context of agency-supervised interconnection agreements.
Fifth, while the Court did not expressly repudiate the essential
facility doctrine, there seems to be little continuing need for two different
sets of rules governing unilateral refusals to deal under '2. Aspen, perhaps
inadvertently, created the apparition of separate doctrines by finding liability
but expressly refusing to embrace the essential facility doctrine. 111 By
contrast, Aspen imposed severe limitations on both doctrines. 112 One is
hard-pressed to see any separate vitality remaining in the essential facility
doctrine.
One purpose of an "essential facility" doctrine is to shift the focus
away from the defendant's intent or conduct, and toward the nature of the
input, or "facility," that the defendant owns and the plaintiff wishes to share.
That is why the doctrine is sometimes said to come dangerously close to
condemning monopoly without fault. Mere ownership of a "facility" that is
"essential" to rivals' ability to produce or sell is said to be sufficient to create
the duty. However, Trinko makes clear that mere ownership of an
"essential" input is insufficient. There must also be other acts, including
short-run "sacrifice" showing bad intent, and perhaps including a history of
dealing, that serve to show that the refusal was a product of anticompetitive
animus. Or, to say it differently, the Court required an element of
anticompetitive conduct above and beyond the refusal to deal itself.
Sixth, the Court expressed concern about the anticompetitive
tendencies, or "tensions," inherent in refusal to deal claims. It observed
three. (1) A refusal to deal rule can "lessen the incentive" to invest to the
extent that it later requires the successful investor to share its
"economically beneficial" facilities with rivals who have not made the

110. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410.
111. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44. ("we find it unnecessary to consider the
possible relevance of the 'essential facilities' doctrine, or the somewhat hypothetical
question whether nonexclusionary conduct could ever constitute an abuse of monopoly
power if motivated by an anticompetitive purpose in its business methods').
112. See 540 U.S. at 410-411 (noting that the Court's 'conclusion would be unchanged
even if we considered to be established law the 'essential facilities' doctrine crafted by some
lower courts").
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investment. 113 (2) Sharing facilities with rivals is a form of cooperation that
can increase the risks of collusion, the "supreme evil of antitrust." 114 (3)
The doctrine must be strictly limited to circumstances where the requested
assets are completely unavailable. "[W]here access exists, the doctrine
serves no purpose." 115 Although the Court did not pursue the implications
of this third point, they are clear enough. A rule that permits firms to obtain
from a larger rival inputs that they or other rivals could possibly construct
for themselves reduces rather than increases competitive incentives. When
the dominant firm refuses to sell an asset, the rival must construct it for
itself or obtain it from another source. As a general proposition competition
is best served not by numerous firms sharing the same productive assets,
but rather when firms each have and control their own production
resources. This conclusion almost certainly overrules elements of decisions
such as the Ninth Circuit's Kodak case, which condemned Kodak's refusal
to sell aftermarket repair parts without requiring a showing that the plaintiffs
could not obtain the parts in question from alternative sources. 116
Seventh, other than speaking about the absence of short-run
sacrifice, as noted above, the Court did not say anything about business
justifications. By contrast, Aspen rested in part on the conclusion that there
was no business justification for the defendant's refusal to deal. 117 The
difference is readily explained. Business justifications become relevant,
and thus must be asserted, only after a prima facie unlawful refusal to deal
has been found. Not having found any prima facie unlawful refusal to deal
in the first place, the Supreme Court did not require any evidence of
business justifications.
Eighth, three Justice 118 would have decided the case against the
plaintiff on grounds of standing. Essentially, the plaintiff in this case was a
customer of a rival, and his injuries were derivative of the rival's injuries.
Further, the rival was in a much better position to make the claim. 119
113. Id. at 408.
114. Ibid.
115. Id. at 411.
116. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 125 F.3d 1195, 1209-1212
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998).
117. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605.
118. Stevens, Souter & Thomas, JJ.
119. Id. at 417:
[Wlhatever antitrust injury respondent suffered because of Verizon's conduct was purely
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Disposing of the case on standing grounds would have eliminated
customer suits of this type but left suits by rivals intact. In deciding the
case on the merits, however, the Court also very likely overruled the
relevant portions of decisions such as the Eleventh Circuit's Covad case,
which pursued largely the same substantive theories but was brought by a
CLEC rival of the defendant. 120
Ninth, the Court took care to maintain the all-important distinction
between unilateral refusals to deal addressed under '2 of the Sherman Act
and concerted refusals addressed under '1. It distinguished the Court's
previous Terminal Railroad and Associated Press cases as inapt because
they involved concerted activity. 121
Tenth, the Court repudiated the Second Circuit's treatment of
monopoly leveraging, relying on its Spectrum Sports decision for the
proposition that no '2 action can be maintained unless there is a
"dangerous probability of success" in monopolizing the second market. 122
The importance of this conclusion is that monopoly leveraging can exist
only where the requirements for the attempt to monopolize offense in the
second market have been satisfied, which is to say simply that there no
longer exists a free-standing monopoly leveraging claim. Additionally,
however, the Supreme Court noted that even the monopoly leveraging
theory "presupposes anticompetitive conduct," and the Court had already
rejected the plaintiff's proposition that the refusal to deal in question
qualified as such conduct. The attempt to monopolize offense generally
has more severe conduct requirements than the substantive
monopolization offense. 123
Eleventh, under the particular approach that the Supreme Court
took to the immunity issue there is no general immunity for antitrust
violations in this industry, and the Court's holding is limited to claims of
derivative of the injury that AT&T suffered. And for that reason, respondent's suit ...
runs both the risk of duplicative recoveries and the danger of complex
apportionment of damages.
(Stevens, J., concurring).
120. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002),
vacated 540 U.S. 1147 (2004).
121. See Trinko, 540 U.S. 410 n.3. citing Terminal Railroad and Associated Press.
122. Id. at 415, citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
On monopoly leveraging claims, see 3 Antitrust Law &652.
123. See 3B Antitrust Law &806d (3d ed. 2008).
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unilateral refusal to deal and monopoly leveraging. 124 For example, if two
or more ILECs or any other participants in telecommunications markets
should fix prices, divide markets, or boycott outsiders, the question of
antitrust liability would have to be revisited under the principles the
Supreme Court expounded.
Limitation to Termination of or Significant Change
in Pre-existing Arrangements
The jury instruction approved in Aspen suggested antitrust liability
for a firm that without proper justification "refuses to enter" a new joint
venture with a competitor. 125 But the facts found antitrust significance only
in the defendant's abandonment of a joint venture initially entered
voluntarily. The Court did not impose a prospective duty to deal where no
such dealing had occurred previously, and there is no reason for thinking it
would have done so. Indeed, the Court made clear:
In the actual case that we must decide, the monopolist did not
merely reject a novel offer to participate in a cooperative venture
that had been proposed by a competitor. Rather, the monopolist
elected to make an important change in a pattern of distribution that
had originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several
years. 126

124. For the Court's treatment of the immunity issues, see 1A Antitrust Law &243g.
125. As the trial judge instructed,
Also a company which possesses monopoly power and which refuses to enter a joint
operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise refuses to deal with a
competitor in some manner does not violate '2 if valid business reasons exist for
that refusal....
Aspen, note _ at 597.
126. Id. at 603. The Court also noted:
"In any business, patterns of distribution develop over time; these may reasonably be
thought to be more efficient than alternative patterns of distribution that do not
develop. The patterns that do develop and persist we may call the optimal
patterns. By disturbing optimal distribution patterns one rival can impose costs
upon another, that is, force the other to accept higher costs."
Aspen, 472 U.S. at 604 n. 31, quoting Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy
at War Against Itself 156 (1978).
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Kodak, 127

The other Supreme Court decision since Otter Tail condemning a
unilateral refusal to deal, was similar. It found a duty only because the
defendant had established a course of selling repairs parts to independent
service organizations and then withdrew from that market in favor of
exclusive self-distribution. Relying on this, the Second Circuit rejected a
claim that elevator manufacturers designed their aftermarket elevator parts
so that they were not interchangeable with the parts of rivals in order to
create an aftermarket monopoly in the maintenance of their own
elevators. 128 :
The limited nature of [the Sherman Act] exception to the right of
refusal to deal is further supported by Eastman Kodak. After five
years working with independent service organizations ("ISOs") to
provide maintenance services on Kodak copiers, Kodak suddenly
implemented a policy of refusing to do business with the ISOs; as a
result, "ISOs were unable to obtain parts ... and many were forced
out of business."... 129 While Eastman Kodak does not expressly
say that a Section 2 claim premised on a refusal to deal cannot
survive absent a prior course of dealing, it was decided in that fact
context, and has been read to support that proposition. 130
And in Schor the Seventh Circuit denied that the defendant had a
general antitrust obligation to set a lower price for its primary product in
order to enable a rival to sell its complementary product to AIDS patients
who needed both products together and who wished the rival's product
rather than the defendant's. 131 Kodak and Aspen had imposed a duty to
deal only when changing an existing course of distribution enabled them to
"take advantage of customers' sunk costs":
Kodak sold copiers that customers could service themselves (or
through independent service organizations). Having achieved
substantial sales, Kodak then moved to claim all of the repair work
for itself. That change had the potential to raise the total cost of
127. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
128. Elevator Antitrust Litigation, 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007).
129. Quoting Supreme Court Kodak decision, 504 U.S. at 458.
130. Elevator, 502 F.3d at 53-54.
131. Schor v. Abbott Laboratories, 457 f.3d 608 (7th cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct.
1257 (2007).
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copier-plus-service above the competitive level-and ... above the
price that Kodak could have charged had it followed a closedservice model from the outset. Schor does not accuse Abbott of any
similar switch that would exploit customers' sunk costs; none is
possible in this market. 132
Judge Easterbrook's observation is particularly interesting because
it suggests one relatively uncommon situation in which consumer harm
from a unilateral refusal to deal is possible. Assume that a monopolist has
a profit maximizing price for parts-plus-service of $100 (parts) plus $10
(service), or $110. At a higher price it will lose too many sales. It provides
some service itself at the $10 price and other service is provided by rivals,
to whom it sells parts. After numerous customers have purchased the
$100 copier the firm stops supplying parts to others and raises its own
service price to $15. 133 While customers contemplating the defendant's
package of copier-plus-service at a price of $115 would balk, customers
who already own the copier are in a different position. They must
contemplate the costs of extracting themselves from the photocopier, and
this might justify payment of a higher price for the service. The issue is not
altogether different from that involving a firm's inducement to others to
adopt its proposed technology standards, while surreptitiously perfecting
patents on them. The firm can surprise rivals with a higher royalty demand
after they have made a prior commitment to a technology standard than
when the relevant choice is prospective.
A precondition for this situation is a prior course of dealing that
commits the customer to the defendant's technology, and then a change in
dealing policy. Presumably that would not work in a case such as Schor
because the two products were consumed at the same time, and thus there
was no "lock-in." Whether the application in Aspen was correct is dubious
because skiers do not make long-term commitments to a particular
"technology" that ties them to the subsequent services offered by a
particular seller. Presumably, they enter the market anew each time they
wish to go skiing.
In Trinko the Supreme Court emphasized that the defendant in that
case had never entered into voluntary dealing, but interconnected with
CLEC's only under compulsion of the Telecommunications Act. 134 As a
result, nothing could be inferred from a decision not to cooperate with a
132. Schor, 457 F.3d at 614 (emphasis added).
133. Of course, it could accomplish the same result by continuing to sell the parts to
independent service organizations, except at the higher price.
134. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 at 410.
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rival. Indeed, the things for which interconnection was required were inputs
that Verizon had not been in the business of selling to anyone. They had
been developed for strictly internal use. 135
The administrative problem of requiring new dealing is also severe.
Firm's create only a small number of actual joint ventures, but they might
create an infinite number of possible joint ventures. The amount of judicial
intervention required to create a new venture is much greater than the
amount needed to maintain an existing one. Suppose, for example, that a
resort town had two amusement parks, one large and quite successful, the
other smaller and less successful. Until now the parks have marketed their
services independently, but now the smaller park claims an antitrust right
that the larger park enter a venture for joint provision of travel packages
including air flights, hotels, ground transportation, and access to both
parks. In granting such relief the court would have to determine from
among infinite possibilities how the parties might have negotiated such a
contract and split its revenues, what kinds of services should be included in
it, which particular hotels or other service providers should be included,
how the package is to be marketed and the like.
As a general matter, court imposed sharing obligations created
under the very general provisions of the antitrust laws must be restricted to
circumstances where the defendant terminated an existing joint venture
without justification. We would not interpret it to give the plaintiff a right to
create a new venture where none had existed before. 136
Collusion Risks
Judicial treatment of Aspen-style claims of refusal to assist a
competitor must be mindful of the fact that significant risks of collusion may
135. Ibid.
136. Thus the Ninth Circuit concluded in SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan,
Inc., 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996) that a dental insurer's refusal
to permit its dentists to accept co-payments from a secondary insurer whose coverage
provided such payments was not a '2 violation. The court refused to extend '2 to joint
ventures not yet in existence earlier:
Unlike the defendant skiing company in Aspen, Delta Dental did not discontinue a
marketing arrangement with SmileCare. Delta Dental's copayment plan preexisted SmileCare's supplemental plan and the parties have never cooperated to
supply the market with a new or better product.
Id. at 786. In any event, the defendant had a valid business justification: the "disciplinary
effect" of insurer copayments prevented overuse of the primary insurer's coverage -something that was undermined by the plaintiff's insurance that provided the copayment.
Ibid.
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attend a joint venture between a dominant firm and its only rival or rivals.
Indeed, the Aspen joint venture had been challenged under '1 and made
subject to a consent decree requiring firms to set price independently
before discussing the venture. 137 But joint price setting is almost inherent
in a marketing venture and the risks of collusion must be counted as
considerable. If the firms in such a market are able to compete effectively
without such a venture, antitrust would not wish to compel it. Further,
except in clear cases an antitrust tribunal would be hard pressed to
balance any gains from increased venture efficiency against the offsetting
losses attending possible or even likely collusion.
Problematically, the smaller firm benefits from either the efficient
venture enabling it to take advantage of joint economies, or the joint
venture facilitating collusion. To the extent the joint venture/cartel
increases prices, the smaller and less efficient firm can prosper while the
larger firm earns even more, both at the expense of consumers.
Collusion risks are presumably insubstantial when the plaintiff could
not compete in the market at all unless given access to the claimed facility.
In that case both sharing and refusing to share yields the monopoly output.
But when the plaintiff is capable of operating in the market without sharing
of the facility, then sharing might facilitate collusion or even make it
irresistible, depending on the circumstances. The risk of collusion is
greatest when the venture itself sets the price, as Aspen-style marketing
ventures typically do. By contrast, the risk of collusion presumably
diminishes as the shared input is further removed from the price-setting
process. For example, the surgeon who successfully claims that a hospital
is an essential facility and joins its staff will not necessarily fix prices with
fellow staff surgeons, although the opportunity for such price fixing must be
counted as greater than if the surgeon practiced in his own office.
Finally, to say that a firm risks '2 liability for failing to enter all
"justified" ventures, but that it risks '1 liability for entering a venture
subsequently found unreasonable 138 forces the dominant firm to thread a
very small needle in an area where antitrust is plagued with ambiguity. It
should not be forgotten that the Aspen claim begins with the essential
premise that the defendant is a monopolist, or dominant firm. Joint
ventures of all the competitors in a market containing such a firm almost
137. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 n.9 (noting that the Colorado attorney general had
filed a complaint alleging that the marketing joint venture in question would provide the
parties "with a forum for price fixing in violation of '1 of the Sherman Act"; the parties settled
with a consent decree permitting the venture but requiring them to set their prices
individually).
138. On the rule of reason for joint activities, see 7 Antitrust Law, Ch. 15.
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always invite antitrust scrutiny for possible '1 violations, but particularly if
price must be determined through the venture itself.
While the Aspen opinion seems to be unconcerned about collusion
risks, Trinko was not. It warned that forced sharing can "facilitate the
supreme evil of antitrust: collusion." 139
Administrability of remedies
Both Terminal Railroad and Associated Press involved collusion, a
fact that clearly limits their application. To be sure, the effects on the
plaintiff and on the market from denying access to an "essential facility" are
the same whether the facility is owned by a combination or by a single
monopolist. Nevertheless, the distinction between the Terminal-AP
situations and the single firm owning an allegedly essential facility is
important for interconnected doctrinal and practical reasons.
Most explicitly, the Sherman Act itself divides its proscriptions
between concerted and unilateral activity, addressing the former in '1 and
the latter only in '2. For example, the economic effects of price fixing by a
combination of competitors may be identical with the price unilaterally set
by a monopolist, yet the former is condemned categorically under '1 while
the latter is not condemned at all under '2. 140
This accepted dichotomy reflects the reality that conspiracies
among unrelated units are relatively infrequent, more easily appraised for
reasonableness, and -- most significantly -- simply remedied through
prohibition. By contrast, unilateral behavior is not only omnipresent, but
also often difficult to evaluate or remedy without involving the antitrust
tribunal in the day-to-day management of the enterprise.
Given the need to distinguish unilateral from collective behavior, the
ordinary business corporation is regarded as a single entity, even though it
comes into being through the combination of the investors who create it.
The creators of a business enterprise necessarily agree or "conspire," but
once the enterprise is lawfully formed, antitrust law usually regards it as the
relevant actor. By contrast, the members of the combination controlling the
Terminal Company or the Associated Press continued to be important
profit-maximizing entities individually in the railroad or newspaper business.

139. Trinko, note __ at 408, citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919).
140. See 3A Antitrust Law &720 (3d ed. 2008).
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Perhaps the standard collective-unilateral distinction might be seen
as a mere statutory formality that is unresponsive to the essential facility
concern and hence that does not illuminate the proper application of '2.
But the distinction is more than a formality. Without necessarily precluding
the imposition of a duty to deal upon a monopolist in some circumstances,
there are several reasons for doing so much less readily than in the
combination cases like Terminal Railroad and AP.
First, forcing the combination to admit others to their collaboration
requires less ongoing day-to-day judicial supervision then requiring a firm
to supply its goods or services. When admission is sought at the outset,
the combination need only provide the excluded parties with the same
terms the collaborators provided for each other. Even later, discriminatory
admission can be remedied simply by ordering admission on nondiscriminatory terms. Even if no one is being admitted, the necessity of
supervising the terms of admission are most often a one-time intervention.
By contrast, requiring a monopolist to sell its goods or services cannot be
implemented unless some agency stands ready to supervise the price or
other terms.
Second, admission to a combination is less likely to require
rationing or other control of assets. In Terminal Railroad and AP, the
competitors could apparently take in additional users without either
displacing existing users or having to add significantly to existing facilities.
In the more typical case of an integrated manufacturing monopolist, a
compulsory dealing decree usually confronts a court with two dubious
alternatives: directing the defendant to expand its capacity or formulating
an "equitable" rationing scheme. The first would force the monopolist to
take investment risks that no court could protect it against, while the
second may require price control to make it effective and offers no guiding
principle to determine who gets what.
Third, admission to a combination is less likely to impair any
efficiencies. By contrast, one cannot, for example, require a transmission
monopolist to wheel power for someone else without attention to the
monopolist's own need for its facilities. Or one cannot compel a monopolist
of a product to sell to independent dealers without attention to the
distribution it carries out through its own employees.
Fourth, admission to a combination is less likely to chill desirable
and pro-competitive activity. Compelling admission on equal terms at the
outset of a combination would chill only those combinations designed to
exclude and to impair rivals' competitive vitality. 141 By contrast, a general
141. If the combination seeks a competitive advantage through means that are
reasonably available to their competitors, the combination would not be an essential facility.
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duty to share output or facilities with rivals could affect the actual or
potential monopolist's choice of what size or type of facility to build in
directions that would be inefficient and, apart from threatened legal
requirements, nonoptimal.
Indeed, a nonexclusivity requirement may be essential in certain
joint venture cases if we are to have assurance that the venture is not
engaged in price fixing or other forms of collusion. We permit certain joint
venture because they enable the firms to reduce costs or improve product
quality with negligible risk of a concerted output reduction and price
increase. In some cases open admissions policies act as an assurance
that such output reductions cannot occur: the cartel cannot survive if it
must continually admit new firms wishing to join. 142
Fifth, exclusion from a combination may be found to be
anticompetitive more readily and without reliance on inherently ambiguous
intent than an individual firm's denial of its goods or services. The existence
of a combination of competitors is itself evidence that its activities are both
important and beyond the capacity of its individual members, for otherwise
the combination itself would not be justified. If the excluded firm cannot
accomplish the same result by itself or find similar partners in the industry,
the inference is very strong that it will be disadvantaged by virtue of the
combination.
By contrast, the mere existence of a monopolist gives no hint of
which of its activities might somehow be essential to its actual or would-be
rivals. Nor does its denial of any requested service to others indicate an
anticompetitive purpose or effect, for there obviously are many innocent
and legitimate reasons for not accommodating the desires of some wouldbe purchasers of a good or service. To be sure, that intent might be
inquired into, but the immediate point is that such complex and often
inconclusive inquiries will be more often necessary when dealing with
single firms than when examining the duties of a combination to admit its
rivals.
Sixth, a legal rule governing combinations will be invoked rarely and
can give relatively clear guidance to the parties and to subsequent
tribunals. By contrast, an "essential facility" doctrine addressed to individual
firms is open-ended and potentially applicable to anything an actual or
attempted monopolist does or has.

142. See 13 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&2220-2223 (2d ed. 2005).

